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Abstract. We study the bidding behavior of spiteful agents who, con-
trary to the common assumption of self-interest, maximize the weighted
difference of their own profit and their competitors’ profit. This assump-
tion is motivated by inherent spitefulness, or, for example, by competitive
scenarios such as in closed markets where the loss of a competitor will
likely result in future gains for oneself. We derive symmetric Bayes Nash
equilibria for spiteful agents in 1st-price and 2nd-price sealed-bid auc-
tions. In 1st-price auctions, bidders become “more truthful” the more
spiteful they are. Surprisingly, the equilibrium strategy in 2nd-price auc-
tions does not depend on the number of bidders. Based on these equilib-
ria, we compare revenue in both auction types. It turns out that expected
revenue in 2nd-price auctions is higher than expected revenue in 1st-price
auctions whenever agents have the slightest interest in reducing others’
profit as long as they still care for their own profit. In other words, rev-
enue equivalence only holds for auctions in which all agents are either
self-interested or completely malicious.
Keywords. Auctions, Externalities, Spite, Revenue
1 Introduction
One of the fundamental assumptions of game theory is that agents are self-
interested, i.e., they maximize their own utility without considering the utility
of other agents. However, there is some evidence that certain types of behavior
in the real world can be better explained by models in which agents have other-
regarding preferences. While there are settings where an agent is interested in
the well-being of other agents, there are also others where an agent intends
to degrade competitors in order to improve his own standing. This is typically
the case in competitive scenarios such as in closed markets where the loss of a
competitor will likely result in future gains for oneself (e.g., when a competitor
is driven out of business) or, more generally, when agents intend to maximize
their relative rather than their absolute utility. To give an example, consider
the popular Trading Agent Competition (TAC) where an agent’s goal clearly
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is to accumulate more revenue than his competitors instead of maximizing his
revenue.
For another example, consider the German 3G mobile phone spectrum license
auction in 2000 which happens to be one of the most revenue generating auctions
to date (50.8 billion Euro). One of the bidders (German Telekom) kept raising
the price beyond a point at which there were as many remaining bidders as
licences. This behavior has been interpreted as an (unsuccessful) attempt to
crowd out one of the weaker competitors [1,2]. Nevertheless, it turned out that
some of the weaker phone companies were unable to cope with the resulting high
amounts of money spent for the licenses. As of today, one of the six winning
bidders (Mobilcom) is struggling with bankruptcy (and gave away its license)
and another one (Quam) filed for bankruptcy. Clearly, a reduced number of
competitors is advantageous for the remaining providers because their share of
the market increases.
Sealed-bid auctions are well-understood competitive economic processes where
questioning the assumption of self-interest is particularly reasonable. For in-
stance, in 2nd-price auctions, according to the dominant strategy equilibrium,
a self-interested bidder is still best off bidding his private value of the good to
be sold even when he knows all other bids. However, a competitive agent who
knows he cannot win might have an incentive to place his bid right below the
winning bid in order to minimize the winner’s profit. In order to make such be-
havior rational, we need to incorporate other-regarding preferences in the utility
function. For this reason, we formalize a notion of utility where a spiteful agent,
i.e., an agent with negative externalities, is interested in minimizing the profit
of his competitors as well as maximizing his own profit (Section 3). The tradeoff
between both goals is controlled by a parameter α called spite coefficient. α = 0
yields self-interested agents whereas α = 1 defines completely malicious agents
whose only goal is to reduce others’ profit. Given this new definition of utility,
the well-known equilibria for 1st- and 2nd-price auctions do not hold anymore
whenever α > 0. We derive symmetric Bayes Nash equilibria for spiteful agents
in both auction types in Section 4 and 5, respectively. Based on these equilibria,
we deduce further results, primarily on auction revenue, in Section 6. The paper
concludes with an overview of the obtained results and a brief outlook on future
research in Section 7.
2 Related Work
Numerous authors in experimental economics [3,4], game theory [5], social psy-
chology [6,7], and multiagent systems [8] have argued in favor of other-regarding
preferences, usually with an emphasis on altruism. Levine introduced a model in
which utility is defined as a linear function of both the agent’s monetary payoff
and his opponents, controlled by a parameter called “altruism coefficient” [3].
This model was used to explain data obtained in ultimatum bargaining and
centipede experiments. One surprising outcome of that study was that an over-
whelming majority of individuals possess a negative altruism coefficient, corre-
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sponding to spiteful behavior. He concludes that “one explanation of spite is
that it is really ‘competitiveness’, that is, the desire to outdo opponents.” Most
papers, including Levine’s, also consider elements of fairness in the sense that
agents are willing to be more altruistic/spiteful to an opponent who is more al-
truistic/spiteful towards them. Brainov defines a generic type of antisocial agent
by letting ∂Ui
∂uj
< 0 for any j 6= i (using the notation defined in Section 3.1) [8].
A game-theoretic model in which buyers have negative identity-dependent ex-
ternalities which “can stand for expected profits in future interaction” has been
studied by Jehiel et al [9].
We extend our previous work on spitefulness in auctions [10], where we have
already given an equilibrium strategy for spiteful agents in 2nd-price auctions
with complete information, i.e., all private values are known, by also considering
1st-price auctions and switching to the more realistic common prior model.3
Until quite recently, we were oblivious to the existence of a surprisingly similar
paper on spiteful bidding [11] that also shows the inequality of revenue in 1st-
and 2nd-price auctions with spiteful bidders (as well as other results on English
auctions). Nevertheless, we believe that our approach has its merits because
the intuitive form of both equilibria as conditional expectations allows for a
considerably simpler proof of revenue inequality. Furthermore, we obtain results
for malicious bidders for the first time.
There are interesting equivalences of the proposed bidding equilibria to loosely
related settings such as charity auctions, auctions with cheating sellers, toeholds,
and knockout sales [12,13,14,15,16].
3 Preliminaries
In this section, we define the utility function of rational spiteful agents and the
framework of the auction setting for which we study the bidding behavior of
these agents.
3.1 Spiteful Agents
A spiteful agent maximizes the weighted difference of his own utility and his
competitors’ utility. It seems reasonable to take the average or maximum utility
when speaking of the competitors’ utility. However, since we only consider single-
item auctions where all utilities except the winner’s are zero, we simply employ
the sum of all remaining agents’ utilities.
Definition 1. A spiteful agent maximizes the utility given by
Ui = (1− αi) · ui − αi ·
∑
j 6=i
uj ,
where αi ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter called spite coefficient.
3 We have used the term “antisocial” instead of “spiteful” in previous publications.
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In the following, the term “utility” will refer to spiteful utility Ui. We will use
the term “profit” to denote conventional utility ui. Obviously, α = 0 yields
self-interested agents (whose utility equals their profit) whereas α = 1 defines a
completely malicious agent whose only goal is to minimize the profit of other
agents without caring for his own well-being. When α = 12 , we say that an agent
is balanced spiteful.4
As mentioned in Section 2, other authors have suggested utility functions
with a linear trade-off between self-interest and others’ well-being. In contrast
to these proposals, our definition differs in that the weight of one’s own utility
is not normalized to 1, allowing us to capture malicious agents who have no
self-interest at all.
3.2 Auction Setting
Except for a preliminary result in Section 6, we assume that bidders are symmet-
ric, in particular they all have the same spite coefficient α. Before each auction,
private values vi are drawn independently from a commonly known probability
distribution over interval the [0, 1] defined by the cumulative distribution func-
tion (cdf) F (v). The cdf is defined as the probability that a random sample V
drawn from the distribution does not exceed v: F (v) = Pr(V ≤ v). Its derivative,
the probability density function (pdf), is denoted by f(v).
Once the auction starts, each bidder submits a bid based on his private
value. The bidder who submitted the highest bid wins the auction. In the 1st-
price auction, he pays the amount he bid whereas in the 2nd-price (or Vick-
rey) auction he pays the amount of the second-highest bid. Extending the no-
tation of Krishna [17], we will denote equilibrium strategies of 1st- and 2nd-
price auctions by bIα(v) and b
II
α (v), respectively. When bidders are self-interested
(α = 0), there all well-known equilibria for both auction types. The unique
Bayes Nash equilibrium strategy for 1st-price auctions is to bid at the expec-
tation of the second-highest private value, conditional on one’s own value be-
ing the highest, bI0(v) = E[X | X < v] where X is distributed according to
G(x) = Fn−1(x) [18,19]. 2nd-price auctions are strategy-proof, i.e., bII0 (v) = v
for any distribution of values [18]. Vickrey also first made the observation that
expected revenue in both auction types is identical which was later generalized
to a whole class of auctions in the Revenue Equivalence Theorem [20,19].
4 1st-Price Auctions
As is common in auction theory, we study symmetric equilibria, that is, equilibria
in which all bidders use the same bidding function (mapping from valuations to
bids). Symmetric equilibria are considered the most reasonable equilibria, but
in principle need not be the only equilibria (see Section 4 for an asymmetric
4 In the case of only two balanced spiteful agents, the game at hand becomes a zero-
sum game.
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equilibrium in an auction with malicious bidders). Furthermore, we guess that
the bidding function is strictly increasing and differentiable over [0, 1]. These
assumptions impose no restriction on the general setting. They are only made
to reduce the search space.
Theorem 1. The following bidding strategy constitutes a Bayes Nash equilib-
rium for spiteful bidders in 1st-price auctions:
bIα(v) = E[X | X < v] where X is drawn from GIα(x) = F
n−1
1−α (x).
Proof. LetWi =
(
bi(vi) > b(1)(v−i)
)
be the event that bidder i wins the auction.
b(1)(v−i) denotes the highest of all bids except i’s. We will also write v(1) to
denote the highest private value. v¯i(b) is the inverse function of bi(v). We will
use the short notation v¯ for v¯(1)(bi(vi)) to improve readability. It is important
to keep in mind that v¯ is a function of bi(vi), e.g., when taking the derivative of
the expected utility.
We will now give the utility of a spiteful agent as defined in Definition 1 for
1st-price auctions. Recall that agent i knows his own private value vi, but only
has probabilistic beliefs about the remaining n− 1 private values (and bids).
E
[
Ui(bi(vi))
]
= (1− α) · Pr(Wi) ·
(
vi − bi(vi)
)
−
α · (1− Pr(Wi)) ·
(
E
[
v(1) | ¬Wi
]− E[b(1)(v−i) | ¬Wi]) (1)
We can ignore ties in this formulation because they are zero probability events
in the continuous setting we consider. By definition, the probability that any
private value is lower than i’s value is given by F (vi). Since all values are in-
dependently distributed, the probability that bidder i has the highest private
value is Fn−1(vi). Thus, the probability that i submits the highest bid can be
expressed by using the inverse bid function.
Pr(Wi) = F
n−1(v¯) (2)
The cdf of the highest of n−1 private values is F(1)(v) = Fn−1(v). The associated
pdf is f(1)(v) = (n−1)Fn−2(v)·f(v). Using standard formulas for the conditional
expectation (see Appendix A), this allows us to compute both expectation values
on the right-hand side of Equation 1.
E
[
v(1) | ¬Wi
]
=
1
1− Fn−1(v¯)
∫ 1
v¯
t · (n− 1)Fn−2(t) · f(t) dt (3)
E
[
b(1)(v−i) | ¬Wi
]
=
1
1− Fn−1(v¯)
∫ bi(1)
bi(vi)
t · (n− 1)Fn−2(v¯(t)) · f(v¯(t)) · v¯′(t) dt
(4)
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Inserting these expectations in Equation 1 and simplifying the result yields
E
[
Ui(bi(vi))
]
= (1− α)(Fn−1(v¯)vi − Fn−1(v¯)bi(vi))−
α(n− 1)
(∫ 1
v¯
t · Fn−2(t) · f(t) dt−
∫ bi(1)
bi(vi)
t · Fn−2(v¯(t)) · f(v¯(t)) · v¯′(t) dt
)
.
When taking the derivative with respect to bi(vi), both integrals vanish due to
the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus and the following observation:
∂
∫ 1
v¯(b)
g(t) dt
∂b
=
∂
(
G(1)−G(v¯(b)))
∂b
= 0− g(v¯(b)) · v¯′(b) (5)
In order to obtain the strategy that generates maximum utility we take the
derivative and set it to zero.
0 = (1− α)
(
(n− 1)Fn−2(v¯) · f(v¯) · v¯′ · vi−
(n− 1)Fn−2(v¯) · f(v¯) · v¯′ · bi(vi)− F (n−1)(v¯)
)
−
α(n− 1)
((
0− v¯ · Fn−2(v¯) · f(v¯) · v¯′)− (0− bi(vi) · Fn−2(v¯) · f(v¯) · v¯′))
From this point on, we treat vi as a variable (instead of bi(vi)) and assume that
all bidding strategies are identical, i.e., v¯ = v¯(1)(bi(vi)) = vi. Using the fact that
the derivative of the inverse function is the reciprocal of the original function’s
derivative (v¯′(bi(vi)) = 1b′
i
(vi)
), we can rearrange terms to obtain the following
differential equation:
b(v) = v − (1− α) · F (v) · b
′(v)
(n− 1) · f(v) (6)
It follows that b(v) ≤ v because the fraction on the right-hand side of the previ-
ous equation is always non-negative (the bidding function is strictly increasing).
Since we assume that there are no negative bids, this yields the boundary con-
dition b(0) = 0. The solution of Equation 6 with boundary condition b(0) = 0
is
b(v) =
1
F
n−1
1−α (v)
∫ v
0
t · n− 1
1− α · F
n−1
1−α
−1(t) · f(t) dt. (7)
Strikingly, the right-hand side of this equation is a conditional expectation (see
Appendix A). More precisely, it is the expectation of the highest of n−11−α private
values below v:
b(v) = E[X | X < v] where the cdf of X is given by GIα(x) = F
n−1
1−α (x) (8)
⊓⊔
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In 1st-price auctions, bidders face a tradeoff between the probability of win-
ning and the profit conditional on winning. An intuition behind the equilibrium
for spiteful agents is that the more spiteful a bidder is, the less emphasis he puts
on his expected profit. Whereas a self-interested bidder bids at the expectation
of the highest of n − 1 private values below his own value, a balanced spiteful
agents bids at the expectation of the highest of 2(n − 1) private values below
his value. Interestingly, agents are “least truthful” when they are self-interested.
Any level of spite makes them more truthful. Furthermore, parameter α defines
a continuum of bidding equilibria between the well-known standard equilibria of
1st-price and 2nd-price auctions. Even though the strategy defined in Equation 8
is not defined for α = 1, it can easily be seen from Equation 6, that bI1(v) = v.
Corollary 1. The 1st-price auction is (Bayes Nash) incentive-compatible for
malicious bidders (α = 1).
This result is perhaps surprising because one might expect that always bidding
1 is an optimal strategy for malicious bidders. The following consideration shows
why this is not the case. Assume that all agents are bidding 1. Agent i’s expected
utility depends on the tie resolution policy. In n − 1 cases, his expected utility
is positive. In the remaining case, if he wins, his utility is zero. By bidding less
than 1, he can ensure that his expected utility is always positive.
Curiously, there are other, asymmetric, equilibria for malicious bidders, e.g.,
a “threat” equilibrium where one bidder always bids 1 and everybody else bids
some value below his private value. It is well-known that asymmetric equilibria
like this exist in 2nd-price auctions (see [21] for a complete characterization).
However, asymmetric equilibria in 2nd-price auctions are (weakly) dominated
whereas the one given above is not, making it more reasonable.
One way to gain insight in the equilibrium strategy is to instantiate F (v)
with the uniform distribution.
Corollary 2. The following bidding strategy constitutes a Bayes Nash equilib-
rium for spiteful bidders in 1st-price auctions when private values are uniformly
distributed.
bIα(v) =
n− 1
n− α · v
Whereas one can get full intuition in the extreme points of the strategy (α =
{0, 1}), the fact that the scaling between both endpoints of the equilibrium
spectrum is not linear in α, even for a uniform prior, is somewhat surprising.
Interestingly, there is a direct correspondence between the equilibrium proposed
in Theorem 1 and the equilibrium for 2nd-price auctions when the seller may
cheat with probability 1 − α (see [16]). Here, cheating means that the seller,
with some probability, places a bogus bid right below the highest bid in order
to increase his revenue.
5 2nd-Price Auctions
In this section, we derive an equilibrium strategy for spiteful agents in 2nd-price
auctions using the same set of assumptions made in Section 4.
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Theorem 2. The following bidding strategy constitutes a Bayes Nash equilib-
rium for spiteful bidders in 2nd-price auctions.
bIIα (v) = E[X | X > v] where X is drawn from GIIα (x) = 1− (1− F (x))
1
α
Proof. Wi, v¯ and all other notations are defined as in the proof of Theorem 1.
The expected utility of spiteful agent i in 2nd-price auctions can be described
in the following way. There are two general cases depending on whether bidder
i wins or loses. In the former case, the utility is simply vi minus the expected
highest bid (except i’s). In the latter case, we can give the expectation of the
winner’s private value. In order to specify the selling price, we need to distinguish
between two subcases: If bidder i submitted the second-highest bid, the selling
price is his bid bi. Otherwise, i.e., if the second-highest of all remaining bids is
greater than bi, we can again give a conditional expectation.
E
[
Ui(bi(vi))
]
= (1− α)· Pr(Wi) ·
(
vi − E[b(1)(v−i) |Wi]
)
−
α·
(
(1− Pr(Wi)) · E
[
v(1) | ¬Wi
]−
Pr
(
(bi(vi) < b(1)(v−i)) ∧ (bi(vi) > b(2)(v−i))
) · bi(vi)−
Pr(bi(vi) < b(2)(v−i)) · E[b(2)(v−i) | bi < b(2)(v−i)]
)
(9)
The conditional expectation of the remaining highest bid, in case bidder i wins,
is as follows (see Appendix A).
E
[
b(1)(v−i) |Wi
]
=
1
Fn−1(v¯)
∫ bi(vi)
bi(0)
t · (n−1)Fn−2(v¯(t)) ·f(v¯(t)) · v¯′(t) dt (10)
We have already given a formula for E
[
v(1) | ¬Wi
]
in Equation 3. The probability
that bi is the second-highest bid equals the probability that exactly one bid is
higher than bi and n − 2 bids are lower than bi. Depending on who submitted
the highest bid, there are n− 1 different ways in which this can occur.
Pr
(
(bi(vi) < b(1)(v−i))∧(bi(vi) > b(2)(v−i))
)
= (n−1)·Fn−2(v¯)·(1−F (v¯)) (11)
The cdf of the second-highest private value (of n− 1 values) can be derived by
computing the probability that the second-highest value is less than or equal to
a given v. Either all n − 1 values are lower than v, or n − 2 values are lower
and one is greater than v. As above, there are n− 1 different possibilities in the
latter case. Thus,
F(2)(v) = F
n−1(v)+(n−1)Fn−2(1−F (v)) = (n−1)·Fn−2(v)−(n−2)·Fn−1(v).
It follows that the pdf is f(2)(v) = (n−1)·(n−2)·(1−F (v))·Fn−3(v)·f(v). Finally,
the conditional expectation of the second-highest bid times the probability of this
bid being higher than bi is
Pr(bi(vi) < b(2)(v−i)) · E[b(2)(v−i) | bi < b(2)(v−i)] =
(n− 1) · (n− 2) ·
∫ bi(1)
bi(vi)
t · (1− F (v¯(t))) · Fn−3(v¯(t)) · f(v¯(t)) · v¯′(t) dt. (12)
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Inserting both expectations and the probability of winning (see Equation 2) into
Equation 9 yields
E
[
Ui(bi(vi))
]
= (1− α)·
(
Fn−1(v¯)vi−
(n− 1)
∫ bi(vi)
bi(0)
t · Fn−2(v¯(t)) · f(v¯(t)) · v¯′(t) dt
)
−
α · (n− 1)·
(∫ 1
v¯
t · Fn−2(t) · f(t) dt−
Fn−2(v¯) · (1− F (v¯)) · bi(vi)− (n− 2)∫ bi(1)
bi(vi)
t · (1− F (v¯(t)))Fn−3(v¯(t))f(v¯(t))v¯′(t) dt
)
.
As in the previous section, we now take the derivative with respect to bi(vi) and
set it to zero. All integrals vanish due to the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus
and the formula given in Equation 5.
0 = (1− α)·
(
(n− 1)Fn−2(v¯) · f(v¯) · v¯′ · vi−
(n− 1)(bi(vi) · Fn−2(v¯) · f(v¯) · v¯′)
)
−
α · (n− 1)·
((
0− v¯ · Fn−2(v¯) · f(v¯) · v¯′)−(
(n− 2) · Fn−3(v¯) · f(v¯) · v¯′ · bi(vi) + Fn−2(v¯)−
(n− 1) · Fn−2(v¯) · f(v¯) · v¯′ · bi(vi)− Fn−1(v¯)
)−
(n− 2) · (0− bi(vi) · (1− F (v¯)) · Fn−3(v¯) · f(v¯) · v¯′
)
Using the fact that the derivative of the inverse function is the reciprocal of the
original function’s derivative (v¯′(bi(vi)) = 1b′
i
(vi)
) and v¯ = vi, we can simplify
and rearrange terms to obtain the following differential equation.
b(v) = v +
α · (1− F (v)) · b′(v))
f(v)
(13)
It turns out that b(0) = 0 does not hold for 2nd-price auctions. However, a bound-
ary condition can easily be obtained by letting v = 1. By definition, F (1) = 1
which yields b(1) = 1. Given this boundary condition, the solution of Equation 13
is
b(v) =
1
(1− F (v)) 1α
∫ 1
v
t · (1− F (t)) 1α−1 · f(t)
α
dt. (14)
Like in the Theorem 1, the right-hand side of Equation 14 resembles a conditional
expectation. In fact, the bidding strategy can be reformulated as the expectation
of some random variable X, given that X > v.
b(v) = E[X | X > v] where the cdf of X is given by GIIα (x) = 1−(1−F (x))
1
α
(15)
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It can easily be checked that GIIα (x) is indeed a valid cdf (G
II
α (0) = 0, G
II
α (1) = 1,
and GIIα (x) is non-decreasing). By inserting this cdf in Equation 18, we obtain
the equilibrium bidding strategy. The resulting expectation is the expected value
of the lowest of 1
α
values above v. Equation 15 is not defined for α = 0, but the
correct equilibrium can quickly be obtained from Equation 13. ⊓⊔
Remarkably, the resulting equilibrium strategy is independent of the number
of bidders n (though it does depend on the prior distribution of private values).
For example, a balanced spiteful bidder bids at the expectation of the lowest of
two private values above his own value. As in the previous section, we try to get
more insight in the equilibrium by instantiating the uniform distribution.
Corollary 3. The following bidding strategy constitutes a Bayes Nash equilib-
rium for spiteful bidders in 2nd-price auctions when private value are uniformly
distributed.
bIIα (v) =
v + α
1 + α
For example, given a uniform prior, the optimal strategy for balanced spiteful
agents is b(v) = 23 · v + 13 , regardless of the number of bidders. Figure 1 shows
equilibrium strategies for both auction types and varying spite coefficients. As in
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Fig. 1. Spiteful equilibrium bidding strategies
the 1st-price auction setting, the surprising equilibrium strategies are those for
0 < α < 1. There is no linear scaling between both extreme points of the equi-
librium spectrum. As we will see in the following section, this leads to important
consequences on auction revenue.
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6 Consequences
In order to obtain useful results from these equilibria, we compare a key measure
in auctions, the seller’s revenue. The well-known Revenue Equivalence Theorem,
which states that members of a large class of auctions all yield the same revenue,
does not hold when agents are spiteful. Figure 2 shows the expected revenue in
both auction types when agents are balanced spiteful and private values are
uniformly distributed.
It can be shown that the revenue gap visible in the figure exists independently
of prior and spite coefficient as long as agents are neither self-interested nor
malicious.
Theorem 3. For the same spite coefficient 0 < α < 1, the 2nd-price auction
yields more expected revenue than the 1st-price auction. When α ∈ {0, 1}, ex-
pected revenue in both auction types is equal in the symmetric equilibrium.
Proof. The statement can be deduced from the following three observations:
– When agents are malicious, expected revenue in both auction types is iden-
tical.
In the 1st-price auction, truthful bidding is in equilibrium. In the 2nd-price
auction, the second-highest bidder bids at the expectation of the highest
private value. In both cases, revenue equals the expectation of the highest
value.
– bIα(v) and b
II
α (v) are strictly increasing in α.
In the 1st-price auction, bidders bid at the (conditional) expectation of the
highest value of a number of private values that grows as α increases. In
the 2nd-price auction, bidders bid at the expectation of the lowest value
of a number of private values that shrinks as α increases. Obviously, both
expectations are increasing in α. More formally, GIα stochastically dominates
GIβ and G
II
α stochastically dominates G
II
β for any α > β.
– bIα(v) is convex in α. b
II
α (v) is concave in α.
Since both equilibria are symmetric, we just need to consider the curvature
of expectations distributed according to GIα(X) and G
II
α (X) for variable α.
Bids in 1st-price auctions are the (conditional) expectation of the highest of
1
1−α values. The slope of this expectation increases as α rises. In 2
nd-price
auctions, bids are the expectation of the lowest of 1
α
values. If it were the
highest value, the slope would be increasing too. However, since it is the
expectation of the lowest value, the slope is strictly decreasing in α.
Let E[RIα] and E[R
II
α ] be the expected revenue in 1
st- and 2nd-price auctions,
respectively, and consider these as functions of α. So far, we know that both
functions are equal for α ∈ {0, 1} and strictly increasing. Furthermore, E[RIα] is
convex and E[RIIα ] is concave. These facts imply that E[R
II
α ] > E[R
I
α] for any
0 < α < 1 (see Figure 2). ⊓⊔
Revenue inequalities for other special conditions such as when bidders or the
seller are risk-averse have been used to argue in favor of one auction form over the
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Fig. 2. Expected revenue
other. Hence, it is appropriate to state that Theorem 3 represents an advantage
of the 2nd-price auction (from the perspective of a seller), especially because the
inequality holds for arbitrarily small α > 0. On the other hand, the difference
in expected revenue is very small, even for just few bidders. For example, the
difference in expected revenue for ten bidders with uniformly distributed private
values is less than 2% for any α (see also Figure 3). An interesting aspect of
Figure 3 is that revenue seems to be maximal for some α slightly below 0.5.
Theorem 4. The difference in expected revenue between 2nd-price and 1st-price
auctions is maximal for some α ≤ 0.5 that approaches 1
1+
√
2
≈ 0.4142 in the
limit as n rises, when private values are uniformly distributed.
Proof. By definition, the revenue difference is the difference of the expectation
of the second-highest bid in 2nd-price auctions minus the highest expected bid
in 1st-price auctions. Instantiating with the uniform distribution, we obtain
E
[
RIIα
]− E[RIα] = bIIα (E[v(2)])− bIα (E[v(1)])
=
n−1
n+1 + α
1 + α
− n− 1
n− α ·
n
n+ 1
=
(1− α) · α
(α+ 1) · (n− α)
[0<α<1]
> 0.
(16)
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In order to obtain the maximal revenue difference, we take the derivative of the
expression given in Equation 16 with respect to α.
0 =
∂
∂α
· (1− α) · α
(α+ 1) · (n− α) =
∂
∂α
· α
2 − α
α− n+ α2 − α · n =
− (α
2 − α)(2 · α− n+ 1)
(α2 + α− n− α · n)2 +
2 · α− 1
α2 + α− n− α · n
=⇒ αmax = n
n+
√
2 ·
√
n · (n− 1)
When there are only two bidders, αmax = 0.5. αmax is strictly decreasing as n
grows.
lim
n→∞
αmax =
1
1 +
√
2
≈ 0.4142
⊓⊔
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Fig. 3. Difference of expected revenue for n = 20
An important extension of our setting is one that deals with asymmetries
in spitefulness. For example, it would be very desirable to extend the revenue
inequality (Theorem 3) to arbitrary profiles of spite coefficients (α1, α2, . . . , αn)
or a general prior from which each αi is drawn. A first step towards this direc-
tion can be made by observing that the equilibrium strategies of self-interested
bidders are somewhat “robust” against spiteful bidding.
Proposition 1. Rational self-interested bidders will stick with their bidding strat-
egy when other agents bid according to the strategies given in Theorem 1 and 2,
respectively, and private values are uniformly distributed.
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Proof. The statement for 1st-price auctions follows from a result by Porter et
al [16] where it has been proven that bidders in 1st-price auctions will stick with
their equilibrium strategy even when other bidders bid constant fractions of their
private value larger than n−1
n
· v (in the case of a uniform prior). This holds for
a certain class of probability distributions, including the uniform distribution.
The statement for 2nd-price auctions trivially follows from the fact that bidding
truthfully is a dominant strategy for self-interested agents and therefore holds
for any given prior. ⊓⊔
The previous proposition relates to a setting in which there are self-interested
and spiteful agents participating in the same auction. Self-interested agents are
aware of this asymmetry whereas spiteful agents believe that everybody is spite-
ful.
7 Conclusion
We studied the bidding behavior of spiteful agents who, contrary to the common
assumption of self-interest, maximize the weighted difference of their own profit
and their competitors’ profit. We derived symmetric Bayes Nash equilibria for
spiteful agents in 1st-price and 2nd-price sealed-bid auctions. The main results
are as follows. In 1st-price auctions, bidders become “more truthful” the more
spiteful they are. When bidders are completely malicious, truth-telling is in Nash
equilibrium. Surprisingly, the equilibrium strategy in 2nd-price auctions does
not depend on the number of bidders. Based on these equilibria, we compared
revenue in both auction types. It turned out that revenue equivalence breaks
down for this setting. Expected revenue in 2nd-price auctions is higher than
revenue in 1st-price auctions whenever the spite coefficient α satisfies 0 < α < 1.
Revenue equivalence only holds for auctions in which all agents are either self-
interested (α = 0) or malicious (α = 1).
There are many open problems left for future work. Most importantly, we
intend to extend the revenue inequality (Theorem 3) to settings with asymmetric
spitefulness.
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A Conditional Expectations
Let X be random variable drawn from the interval [0, 1] according to the cumu-
lative distribution function F (x). The expectation of X is E[X] =
∫ 1
0
t · f(t) dt.
The conditional expectation that X is greater or smaller than some constant x,
respectively, is given by the following formulas.
E[X | X < x] = 1
F (x)
∫ x
0
t · f(t)dt (17)
E[X | X > x] = 1
1− F (x)
∫ 1
x
t · f(t)dt (18)
